Private Law: Insurance by Purvis, G. Frank, Jr.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 24 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Appelate Courts for the
1962-1963 Term: A Symposium
February 1964
Private Law: Insurance
G. Frank Purvis Jr.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
G. Frank Purvis Jr., Private Law: Insurance, 24 La. L. Rev. (1964)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol24/iss2/12
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
It is true that the Title Controversy Committee of the Louisiana
State Mineral Board affords some measure of relief. But nego-
tiations with that body may be unsuccessful, or at least unsatis-
factory, and for the ordinary individual claiming title adversely
to the state the problems of securing authorization to bring suit
may prove insurmountable in such circumstances.
The Walmsley decision appears to be a compassionate re-
sponse to the plight of citizens with title claims against the state.
The court could limit the damage done to the concepts underly-
ing our system of real actions by restricting it to similar situa-
tions involving controversy with the state as in other cases
litigants have remedies available through the real actions. How-
ever, remedial legislation seems preferable.
INSURANCE
G. Frank Purvis, Jr.
The great volume of insurance litigation considered by the
Louisiana appellate courts in past years continued during the
1962-1963 term. Over one hundred decisions of our appellate
courts were rendered during that time. Those of most general
interest and significance are reviewed in these comments. The
Supreme Court rendered only two of the decisions, a rather un-
usual fact in view of the large number of decisions.
I. LIFE COVERAGES
In the field of life insurance, the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peal applied the usual rule in holding that the wife forfeits her
rights as the beneficiary of the policy of life insurance on the
life of her husband when she feloniously kills him and the insur-
ance proceeds then become the property of the insured's estate.
As such the proceeds are property of the decedent's separate
estate and are not community property. In the opinion of the
court, it would be illogical and against public policy to hold that
the wife, denied recovery personally for feloniously killing her
husband, yet could recover half of the proceeds as her commu-
nity interest. The only interest a wife could have, the court
says, would be the recovery from her husband's estate of half
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the community funds used in payment of the insurance pre-
miums.'
Where a rescission rather than the enforcement of a contract
was sought, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that
an insured had the right to rescind a life insurance contract and
to secure the refund of the premiums paid where the evidence
established that he would not have purchased the policy except
for error induced by fraudulent representations made by the in-
surer's agent that large dividends would be paid on the policy.
Such representations were shown to be material, and the reli-
ance which had been placed thereon was shown not to be unrea-
sonable to the extent that it would constitute fault or negligence
on the part of the plaintiff sufficient to estop him. The court,
in applying the rule that the insured must act promptly and seek
relief within a reasonable time, found that a delay of two years
between the time the policy was issued and the suit was com-
menced was excused because the insured, a forty-nine year old
farmer with little formal education, was unable to understand
the insurance contract and had relied on a written schedule of
premiums and dividends which had been given to him by the
agent.2
Both the Second and Third Circuits had for consideration
the termination of coverage under the contract issued by the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in accordance with the
Federal Employee Group Life Insurance Act of 1954. In the
first case the Second Circuit upheld the provision of the policy
which provided that the insurance would cease on the civilian
federal employee who had been issued coverage thereunder on
the date of separation. The thirty-one day grace period for con-
version of the policy expired before the decedent's death and
the right to convert had not been exercised. The court enforced
the termination provision of the policy measuring the thirty-one
day grace period from the date of the employee's separation
from service even though an advanced premium, previously de-
ducted from his salary, would have paid for the coverage beyond
the termination date.8 The Third Circuit, in construing the same
provision, reached a similar conclusion and found that a pay-
ment to the insured by his employer of a sum representing his
1. Butler v. Life Ins. Co. of Georgia, 147 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
2. Broussard v. Fidelity Standard Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 292 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1962).




accrued annual leave had no significance in determining the date
he was separated from federal service so as to be within the
extended coverage of the group policy. Additionally, they held
the right of conversion under the contract to be a right that
could not be inherited by the widow of the insured upon his
death.
4
II. HOSPITALIZATION AND HEALTH COVERAGES
One of the cases considered by the Supreme Court involved
the interpretation of a hospitalization contract. The case was
first considered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal.5 In its
decision that court held hospital expenses incurred more than
eight months after the date of an accident were within the cov-
erage granted by the policy despite the insurer's claim that its
coverage was limited to hospital expenses incurred within thirty
days of the accident by the policy language. Penalties and at-
torney's fees were granted for the insurer's failure to pay. The
Supreme Court granted a writ to review that portion of the
judgment of the court of appeal which awarded penalties and
attorney's fees. That portion of the contract which leads to the
controversy provides "If the Insured shall, within 30 days from
the date of such injury, require any necessary hospital care or
service, the Company will pay such expense incurred, provided,
however, that the Company's maximum liability for Medical,
Surgical and/or Hospital care shall not exceed a maximum of
$3,000.00 and provided that such expense shall be incurred with-
in fifty-two weeks from the date of such injury." The Supreme
Court found that the insurer's refusal to pay the claim was un-
reasonable and was based upon a "far-fetched, impossible inter-
pretation placed on this provision of the policy it wrote." Hav-
ing found the interpretation unjustified, the court found the
company's refusal to pay a proper ground for the imposition of
the statutory penalty."
In a case involving a question of jurisdiction and venue the
Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that the term "insurance
policy" as used in the statutes relating to venue of actions on
insurance policies includes any contract of insurance regardless
of the manner in which the contract is evidenced. Where the
4. Funderburk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 146 So. 2d 710 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962).
5. Fontenot v. Wabash Life Ins. Co., 143 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
6. Fontenot v. Wabash Life Ins. Co., 150 So. 2d 10 (La. 1963).
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plaintiff relied upon the charter, the general rules, and the by-
laws of a corporation showing that members in good standing
are entitled to specified medical and hospital expenses the court
found that this was sufficient evidence of a health and accident
insurance contract within the meaning of the term "health and
accident insurance policy" as used in Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 76.7
III. AGENTS AND AGENTS' LIABILITY
Two cases of interest considered the agent's liability for fail-
ure to obtain coverage.8 In the Fourth Circuit the court found
that the evidence sustained a cause of action for damages
against the insurance agency because of a failure to place bur-
glar insurance on the plaintiff's property in accordance with an
alleged agreement. In this case the plaintiff had requested in-
surance and had been advised that the same was in effect. The
defendant agent had inspected the premises and, while he denied
that any commitment had ever been made, upon being notified of
the claim he attempted to have the company make an ex gratia
payment to the insured. The Third Circuit, relying upon the
foregoing and other similar decisions, reiterated the established
rule to the effect that recovery may be allowed a prospective
insured where the actions of the insurance agent are shown to
be such as to warrant an assumption by the insured that he was
adequately covered by suitable insurance. The court here found
that the limits of liability which the defendant agent asserted
he had agreed to obtain, would be the limit of recovery and that
the plaintiff had not been misled to expect more than this.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeal, in determining whether
or not sufficient notice had been given of the acquisition of
another automobile to secure coverage under an existing policy,
found that an agency relationship may exist in fact outside the
scope of the statutes regulating insurance brokers and solicitors.
The effect of this was to hold the insurance company bound by
a notice given to an individual said to be authorized as a repre-
sentative of a licensed and authorized agency of the company
although the individual did not hold an agent's or solicitor's li-
cense or contract to represent the agency or the insurance com-
7. Francis v. Texas & Pacific Railway Employees Hospital Association, 148
So. 2d 118 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
8. Clyde Bourgeois, Jr. v. Beeson-Warner Agency, 144 So. 2d 563 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) ; Arceneaux v. Bellard, 149 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
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pany. These regulatory "statutes do not exclude other insurance
relationships. That is, these regulatory insurance statutes do
not prevent the courts from finding that an agency relationship
exists in fact, outside the scope of the statutes." It is interesting
to note that at the time the notice was given to the individual,
Frazier, he was licensed only as a life insurance agent. The
court apparently did not consider the distinction between a li-
censed life insurance agent and a licensed agent for lines other
than life in deciding the case. It would appear to be of no sig-
nificance since the question of whether or not the individual
actually held a license from the state was not a point upon which
the decision turned.9
IV. AUTOMOBILE COVERAGES
As one would expect, the greatest number of insurance cases
litigated involved automobile coverages. The direct action stat-
ute was up for consideration a number of times. In a case where
the plaintiff commenced suit against the insurer alone under the
option provided for in the direct action statute, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeal found that this did not constitute an ir-
revocable "election of remedies," and by such action, the plain-
tiff did not forfeit the right to proceed against the insured tort-
feasor. The court found that the injured person or his survivors
had a right of direct action against the insurer and such action
might be brought against the insurer alone or against the in-
sured and the insurer jointly and in solido in the parish where
the accident occurred. Further, the insured and the insurer were
held as debtors in solido to the plaintiff although the insured
was bound in tort and the insurer in contract, subject to the
limits of liability contained in the policy by which the insurer
was bound. 10
The Supreme Court in Indiana Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Russell, reviewed by writ of certiorari a decision of the Second
Court of Appeal in the same case" to determine the extent of
coverage granted under the terms of an automobile policy. The
facts show that Billy Russell had a policy on a Pontiac which he
owned and while this policy was in effect he married Sandra,
9. Mathews v. Marquette Casualty Company, 152 So. 2d 577 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963).
10. Finn v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 141 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1962).
11. 135 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), rehearing denied, 243 La. 189,
142 So.2d 391 (1962).
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who owned a Ford automobile and carried public liability insur-
ance thereon with another company. Subsequently, Billy Russell
was issued a renewal policy by the insurer. Upon the expira-
tion of this renewal policy there was a lapse of time in which no
policy was in force before a subsequent policy was issued on
February 4, 1962, without consultation between Russell and the
agent. The premium was not paid and the policy was finally
cancelled. However, between the date of its issue and the date
of its cancellation Russell was involved in an accident while driv-
ing his wife's Ford automobile. The policy which was in effect
at this time described only the Pontiac automobile and no policy
was in effect on the Ford owned by the wife. Under these cir-
cumstances, the insurance company sued for a declaratory judg-
ment seeking to escape the possibility of liability under the
policy which was limited to the Pontiac described therein. Rus-
sell asserted that he was covered for the liability created by the
accident while driving the Ford, since under the terms of the
policy on the Pontiac he and his wife are both named insureds
and that the Ford was, therefore, an owned automobile as it was
owned by a named insured. In an exhaustive review the Su-
preme Court found that the Family Combination Policy by its
clear and express language "provides insurance protection to
the insured and members of the insured's household while using
an automobile owned either by the insured named in the declara-
tion or his spouse." Emphasis was placed by the court upon the
fact that the policy was issued without any restriction as to the
coverage of owned automobiles although the company and its
agent had knowledge of the ownership of the Ford. The opinion
also charged the insurance company with notice of the appli-
cable rules of the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission which
provided in part with respect to Family Coverage that "if all
owned automobiles, as defined in this Supplement, are not to be
insured in this policy the appropriate endorsement must be at-
tached." There is a strong dissent by Judge Hawthorne stating
that the interpretation placed on the policy by the majority goes
beyond the language of the contract and beyond the intention of
the parties.
That portion of the automobile contract which excludes from
coverage injury to property "owned or transported by the in-
sured" was up for consideration by the appellate courts. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal considered the case in which the
Maryland Casualty Company had issued an automobile liability
1964]
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policy to Trahan and the General Accident Fire and Life Assur-
ance Corporation had issued a collision policy to him, both poli-
cies being written on the one automobile owned by Trahan.
Trahan gave permission to Miss Wyble to drive his automobile
and she negligently damaged it. The General Accident paid for
the repair of the damaged car and as subrogee of Trahan
brought suit against Miss Wyble to recover the amount so paid.
Miss Wyble then filed a third party action against the Maryland
Casualty Company asserting that she was insured under the
liability policy, and, therefore, any judgment rendered against
her should be paid by the Maryland Casualty Company. The
Maryland contended that it had no liability because when the
accident occurred the automobile was being driven by Miss
Wyble who had become an insured under the terms of the policy
upon receiving permission to use it and who was, therefore, "in
charge of the property." The court found that the exclusion in
the policy was plain and unambiguous and that Maryland was
not liable as an insurer for damage to the automobile while it
was in the care and charge of Miss Wyble, an insured under
the policy at the time of the accident. 12 The First Circuit Court
of Appeal considered an almost identical question, and, citing
the Wyble case, arrived at the same conclusion. 13 Until the de-
cision in the Wyble case, the question was res nova in Louisiana.
The oft-considered question of the right of an owner-pas-
senger of an automobile to recover damages, caused by the neg-
ligent driving of the owner's permittee and agent, from the
owner-passenger's own insurer under the omnibus clause of an
automobile liability policy was reviewed exhaustively in Grimes
v. American Motorists Ins. Co.' 4 In a well-reasoned opinion, the
court reviewed the former jurisprudence and stated the rule to
be that the owner-passenger may recover such damages but this
right will be barred by any independent or contributory negli-
gence. In determining whether there is such negligence, the
owner-passenger is under a greater obligation than is a guest
passenger since the owner-passenger has a right to control the
operation of a motor vehicle by his agent and the duty to do so.
A failure in this duty which is shown to be the proximate cause
12. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Wyble, 144 So. 2d 114 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1962).
13. Middlesex Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Ballard, 148 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1963).




of the accident is a bar to his recovery as it convicts him of con-
tributory or independent negligence.
Two cases of interest in which the appellate courts consid-
ered the provisions of an automobile policy which require co-
operation of the insured in any claim, and notice to the com-
pany when any suit is brought against the insured, sustained
the validity of the policy requirements. In the first instance,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeal denied liability against the
Marquette Casualty Company when the insured had failed to
notify the company of citations and pleadings which had been
served upon an omnibus insured. In so holding, it found that
the insurer need not show that its rights had been prejudiced by
the insured's failure to comply with the policy requirement as to
the forwarding of the suit papers in order to be relieved of the
liability under the policy. 15 In the second case, the Third Cir-
cuit found that a breach of cooperation clause by the insured
must be both material and prejudicial to relieve the insurer of
liability.10
In other interesting cases the courts found that a release by
one motorist of claims arising from an accident with another
motorist did not create any liability in favor of third parties for
injuries received in the same accident, even though the release
contained language stating that the party signing it did cove-
nant to indemnify and save harmless the party to whom it was
granted.17 Payments made by non-tortfeasors are not deductible
by liability carriers when such payments are made from collat-
eral sources wholly independent of the wrongdoer.' s And auto-
mobile coverage does not extend to damages caused by the explo-
sion of a tire which has been removed from a trailer and is being
worked on while so removed, the court finding that the language
granting coverage for bodily injury "caused by accident, while
occupying or through being struck by an automobile" not to in-
clude such an injury. 19 The sufficiency of notice of cancellation
with respect to automobile coverage was considered and lan-
guage stating that "this leaves us with no alternative, and we
are obligated to notify you that this policy is cancelled, effective
on 10-13-57 12:01 A.M. Standard Time," was held to be suffi-
15. Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
16. Freyou v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
17. Moore v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 149 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
18. Roux v. Brickett, 149 So. 2d 456 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).




cient under the statutory requirement as being clear, unequivo-
cable, unambiguous, and valid and effective.
20
V. FIRE COVERAGE
Cases of note in the fire insurance field included a review by
the appellate courts of the proper penalty which can be assessed
on the non-payment of claims on a fire contract (12%, not
25%) ;21 and a determination that an agreed adjustment after
a fire loss becomes a new contract and its enforcement therefore
not subject to any policy restriction. 22
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
Although the Louisiana appellate courts handed down more
than a hundred decisions on workmen's compensation during
the past term, most of these either were resolutions of factual
disputes or involved only reiterations of familiar rules and prin-
ciples. This reviewer was unable to locate more than a dozen
decisions whose novelty or contribution to the compensation law
of Louisiana justifies any extended comment.
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
It is a fundamental observation in workmen's compensation
law that an employee is not entitled to compensation unless his
work was in the course of his employer's hazardous trade, busi-
ness, or occupation.' Somewhat similarly, an employee of a
contractor cannot successfully claim compensation from his em-
ployer's principal under R.S. 23:1061 unless the employer-con-
tractor was executing work which was a part of the principal's
trade, business, or occupation.2 Thus the relationship between
20. Alexander v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 148 So. 2d 898 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1962).
21. Welch v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 145 So. 2d 376 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1962).
22. McCarter v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 147 So. 2d 104
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE
§ 102 (1951).
2. Id. § 125.
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